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Abstract –Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally.
The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is
beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible consequence of this feedback we consider a
coevolutionary model where the local cooperation level determines the payoff values of the applied
prisoner’s dilemma game. We observe that the coevolutionary rule provides a significantly higher
cooperation level comparing to the traditional setup independently of the topology of the applied
interaction graph. Interestingly, this cooperation supporting mechanism offers lonely defectors a
high surviving chance for a long period hence the relaxation to the final cooperating state happens
logarithmically slow. As a consequence, the extension of the traditional evolutionary game by
considering interactions with the environment provides a good opportunity for cooperators, but
their reward may arrive with some delay.
Protecting environment is often considered as a social
dilemma where mutual defection can easily lead to the
tragedy of the common state [1, 2]. In the reversed case
cooperating players do not just avoid the undesired sce-
nario but they can produce a globally improved environ-
ment that is profitable for all members. This effect is not
limited to human societies, but can also be observed in mi-
crobiological systems. For example when bacteria secrete
compounds for nutrient scavenging then its consequence
is useful for all competitors [3–5].
We should not forget, however, that not only coopera-
tors benefit from the improved state of the environment,
but it can also elevate the temptation to defect. In other
words, in a rich environment a defector gains more than
a similar defector who wants to exploit others in a world
where the average income is low. Accordingly, it is a more
realistic approach to leave the traditional concept of fixed
payoff elements and assume that these values may change
in time and space. This concept assumes that the general
state of environment determines the level of interactions
of players, which are considered via the actual values of
payoff elements [6].
In this work we apply this concept by using a coevolu-
tionary protocol where there is a feedback between the lo-
cal cooperation level and payoff values of social dilemma.
In particular, we introduce an adjustable coupling con-
cerning how the actual state of environment influences the
interactions of competitors and explore its consequence
on the behavior of spatial systems. As we will show in
what follows, the applied coevolutionary protocol has a
largely unequal consequence on the evolution of strategies
and cooperators will be supported by increasing the cou-
pling with the environment. On the other hand, defectors
may also benefit from improved environment, at least tem-
porarily. Albeit they cannot escape their fate, their fight
results in an unexpectedly slow relaxation that cannot be
observed in the traditional model.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows.
First, we describe the coevolutionary model that is fol-
lowed by a brief discussion of the well-mixed model. Next
we present our main observations for spatially structured
populations, whereas lastly we summarize and discuss
their implications.
In the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game we consider
cooperation and defection as the two competing strategies.
The payoff elements which characterize their relations are
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fixed and can be interpreted in the following way: two co-
operators collect R reward each for mutual cooperation, a
defector realizes T temptation value against a cooperator,
while P determines the punishment for mutual defection,
and finally S is the income of cooperator when playing
with a defector. The rank of these payoff values, namely
S < P < R < T , ensures that it is better to defect inde-
pendently of the partner’s choice. Mutual defection, how-
ever, can be avoided in spatial systems where players have
limited and at least temporarily fixed connections [7]. In
the last two decades several pioneering works highlighted
that topology of interaction graph plays a decisive role
on the high cooperation level of resulting stationary state
[8–14]. We note that there are several other alternative
ways to avoid the full defection state by considering more
sophisticated strategies [15–22], introducing punishment
or reward [23–28].
These models, however, assume that the interactions
between players of different strategies are uniform in the
whole space and remain fixed in time [29]. Needless to say,
this hypothesis could be oversimplified because the temp-
tation value or the benefit of mutual cooperation may de-
pend on site due to heterogeneous local environment. To
catch the latter effect, we adopt the hypothesis when the
actual state of local environment influences the quality of
interaction between players, which may alter the decisions
of competitors about strategy update [6]. This extension
can be executed via a coevolutionary model where both
the interaction of strategies and the resulting strategy dis-
tribution coevolve in time [30]. The feedback between the
environment and individual state is based on the locally
evaluated cooperation level that influences the payoff val-
ues.
In particular, we propose that R and T values are not
fixed, but may change in time and space and their values
depend on the actual cooperation level of the local commu-
nity. For instance, suppose that player i has G−1 nearest
neighbors hence it is a focal player of a smaller group of
G members, where the number of cooperators is nC . If i
is a cooperator then it can collect R = R0(1 + αnC/G)
reward from a C − C link. If i is a defector then it gets
T = T0(1+αnC/G) payoff from a D−C connection. Here
R0 = 1 and T0 are fixed values of the traditional prisoner’s
dilemma game [7] and α ≥ 0 determines the strength of
feedback from environment. If α = 0 then the payoff ele-
ments become independent from the state of environment
while for high α value there is a strong feedback between
the local cooperation level and the increment of payoff el-
ements. For simplicity we assume that the rest of payoff
elements, P and S, are fixed.
The dynamics of the strategy update which governs the
microscopic evolution is based on the imitation of a more
successful neighbor [10]. During an elementary step we
choose a player i randomly who acquires its payoff Πi by
playing the game with all its neighbors. Next, a randomly
chosen partner of i, denoted by j, also acquires its payoff
Πj by playing the game with all its neighbors. Player
i then attempts to imitate the strategy of player j with
the probability w = {1 + exp((Πi −Πj)/K)}
−1, where K
determines the level of uncertainty via strategy adoptions.
To make our results comparable to previous findings we
use K = 0.1 noise value, but we stress that qualitatively
similar results can be found for other K values.
During the Monte Carlo simulations we have used at
least N = 105 players, but the system size was increased
until N = 106 players when the fraction of C or D players
was too low. In particular, we paid special attention to
avoid finite-size effect originated from the usage of small
system size. Instead, we checked our results using different
system sizes and accepted them only if they remained un-
changed by increasing system size further. In agreement
with the standard protocol during a full Monte Carlo step
the above described elementary step is executed N times,
hence on average all players have a chance to update their
states. After the successfully long relaxation, which takes
typically 104 − 105 Monte Carlo steps, we have averaged
the fluctuating level of cooperation over another 104 steps.
The data were averaged over 10 independent runs. Addi-
tionally, to reach the desired accuracy in case of hetero-
geneous graphs we averaged the results over 100 indepen-
dently generated networks.
It is worth stressing that this model does not only pro-
vide a more realistic model of the evolution of cooperation,
but it also bridges the gap between games based on pair-
interactions with descriptions where the social dilemma is
described by public goods game-like multi-point interac-
tions [31]. More precisely, the players’ payoff is calculated
solely based on payoff elements of pair interactions, but
these values are depending on the collective behavior of
the whole group.
Before presenting our main findings in structured pop-
ulations we briefly discuss the case of unstructured pop-
ulations. In a well-mixed system the fraction of cooper-
ators can be denoted by x. By using this notation the
average payoff of a cooperator player is ΠC = xR0(1 +
αx) + (1 − x)S while the average payoff of a defector is
ΠD = xT0(1+αx) + (1− x)P . If we keep the rank S ≤ P
between the payoff elements then it is easy to see that ΠD
always exceeds ΠC . Accordingly, only the full D state is
evolutionary stable state. Put differently, the introduction
of coevolutionary coupling between the state of environ-
ment and payoff values does not change the behavior of
the traditional well-mixed model.
In spatially structured populations, however, we face
to a quantitatively different situation because the het-
erogeneous performance of groups provides a cooperator
supporting mechanism. This can already be recognized
at the simplest level of multi-point approximations for
square lattice topology [32, 33]. When applying the n-
point level of this approach, which is a dynamical version
of the cluster variation method, we find a hierarchy of evo-
lution equations for the probability distributions of con-
figurations within a cluster of n sites. (For further details
and direct applications to evolutionary game systems, see
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Fig. 1: Fractions of cooperators for three different interaction
graphs at α = 10. In case of square lattice and random regular
graph z = 4 was used at S = 0. For proper comparison in case
of scale-free graph the average degree is 〈z〉 = 4 where S = −0.2
was used. An arrow at low T0 value shows the typical threshold
value of temptation until cooperators survive in the α = 0 case
irrespectively of the graph topology. For random and scale-free
topology the typical system size was N = 105, while the linear
system size of square lattice was L = 400. At the vicinity of
transition points we used larger system sizes as it is specified
in the main text. Inset shows the results of pair-approximation
in square lattice for two extreme α values.
[10,34,35].) At n = 2, called pair-approximation, we only
have two independent variables which can determine the
probability of all two-site strategy distributions. By solv-
ing numerically the equation systems we can determine the
cooperation level in dependence of T0 for different values
of α parameters. In contrast to the well-mixed case here
the results do depend on the strength of coupling. For
two extreme α values the results are plotted in the inset
of Fig. 1, which shows that coupling the present state of
environment to the actual payoff values has a cooperator
supporting consequence.
We can confirm this conclusion by the results of Monte
Carlo simulations. In case of strong coupling (α = 10)
three representative curves are plotted on the main plot
of Fig. 1 for three different interaction graphs. Here S = 0
was applied for the square and the random regular graphs,
while S = −0.2 was used for the scale-free graph. In the
latter case S = 0 would result in too high cooperation
level even for the traditional (α = 0) case [8], therefore
we needed a negative sucker’s payoff to demonstrate the
difference between the traditional and coevolving models.
For comparison an arrowmarks the typical threshold value
of T0 until cooperators survive in the traditional models
when spatially uniform and fixed payoff values are used.
These results suggest that there is a strong cooperator
supporting consequence if we allow a feedback between
the local cooperation level and the actual payoff values
which characterize the interactions of strategies. While a
defector gains significantly more in the neighborhood of
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Fig. 2: Color-coded fraction of cooperators on α − T0 plane
for four different cases. Panel (a) shows the square lattice in-
teraction graph at S = 0, while panel (b) shows the case of
random regular graph using the same S value. Panel (c) shows
the case of scale-free topology when S = −0.2 was used. Fi-
nally, panel (d) shows scale-free topology again but here degree-
normalized payoff values were applied. In the latter case S = 0
was used again.
cooperators, the positive consequence of coupling is even
stronger for cooperators who can support each other more
efficiently.
A more general overview about the consequence of envi-
ronmental feedback can be seen in Fig. 2 where we plotted
the cooperation level in dependence of two key parame-
ters, such as T0 and α. To demonstrate the robustness of
the reported effect we have used different topologies and
different ways how payoffs are calculated. Panel (a) sum-
marizes the results for square lattice interaction topology
when S = 0 was used. Panel (b) shows the results when
the original square lattice is fully randomized by rewiring
links and introducing short cuts as it was originally de-
scribed in Ref. [34]. In this way we introduced small-world
character into the topology without changing the uniform
degree-distribution of nodes. The comparison of the men-
tioned panels indicates that the translation invariant reg-
ularity of lattice topology does not influence the observed
effect relevantly, which remains valid even if small-world
like feature characterizes the host network.
The positive impact of environment coupling on coop-
eration level remains intact if we apply largely heteroge-
neous degree distribution in the interaction graph. For
p-3
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Fig. 3: Interface propagation stating from a prepared initial state. Here the 400× 400 square lattice is horizontally divided into
two parts, where in the top half we applied α = 0, while in the bottom half α = 10 is used. (To keep the distinct feedback
conditions for the whole evolution, invasion across the horizontal borders is not allowed.) In both cases T0 = 0.8 is used to
ensure the final dominance of cooperators. At the beginning, shown in panel (a), red defectors are framed by narrow strips of
cooperators (the latter stripes are not visible due to large linear system size). Panel (b) shows the states after 300 Monte Carlo
steps where invasion of blue cooperators becomes visible. In the bottom half the moving interface is smoother and the invasion
is faster than in the top half. After 480 MC steps, shown in panel (c), the homogeneous defector domain already disappears in
the bottom half, but the fast invasion left singular defectors behind the fronts. Finally, full cooperator state is reached for both
cases but the relaxation is faster in the top half.
instance, when scale-free graph is used we can observe
similar effect as previously: as we increase the coupling
between the environment and the applied payoff values
then a higher general cooperation level can be reached
and cooperators can dominate the whole system even at
so high T0 level which would cause their extinction in the
traditional model. Note that here we had to use a signifi-
cantly smaller S = −0.2 value because scale-free topology
at S = 0 would result in dramatically high cooperation
level even for the traditional model [8,36]. The latter fact
would make it impossible to distinguish high cooperation
levels hence to illustrate the positive consequences of envi-
ronmental coupling for the frequently used weak prisoner’s
dilemma case.
Turning to the last panel (d) we still use scale-free topol-
ogy but apply a conceptually different way of payoff cal-
culation. More precisely, we normalized the payoff values
of every players by their degree, which changes the coop-
eration level dramatically. In the latter case, when hubs
cannot collect significantly higher payoff values than their
neighbors or the cost of maintaining connections is con-
sidered, the general cooperation falls back to a poor level
observed for graphs which are characterized by homoge-
neous degree distribution [37–39]. (This negative conse-
quence of payoff normalization allowed us to use S = 0
value again.) In the extended version, however, our re-
sults illustrate again that the coevolutionary coupling of
environment and payoff has a positive consequence even if
we use normalized payoff values.
Based on the presented observations we may conclude
that the feedback mechanism, which allows coevolution
of strategies and payoff values, can enhance the positive
consequence of network reciprocity efficiently. This con-
clusion can be tested directly if we monitor how interface
separating homogeneous domains evolves at different cou-
pling rates. Figure 3 shows such a comparison where we
divided horizontally the space into two subsystems where
in the top half α = 0 while in the bottom half α = 10 was
used during the evolution. To maintain these differences
between the subsystems we prohibited strategy invasion
across the horizontal border lines (which are on the top,
middle, and on the bottom of the square lattice). All
the other parameter values are identical for both subsys-
tems. We are interested in how both subsystems reach the
full cooperator state therefore we used a small T0 = 0.8
value which provides this final state even for the tradi-
tional (α = 0) case.
At the beginning we start from an almost defector state,
colored by red, where their homogeneous domains are bor-
dered only by narrow vertical stripes of cooperators. The
latter are colored by blue but the width of these stripes
is only 5 lattice sites which is invisible at such large lin-
ear system size (L × L = 400 × 400 was used to follow
the spreading of interface properly). When evolution is
launched cooperators start invading defector domains due
to the small T0 value. In agreement with the enhanced net-
work reciprocity conjecture the interface moves faster and
remains more regular in the bottom half where the coevo-
lutionary protocol is applied. In the top half, where only
the pure network reciprocity is at work, this domain wall
is more fluctuating and the width of the defector domain
shrinks slower. Interestingly, however, the faster invasion
in the bottom half leaves many lonely defectors behind the
front. These ”snow-flake”-like pattern seem to be long life
and disappear very slowly. Nevertheless, we stress that
both subsystems terminate into the full cooperator state
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Fig. 4: Decay of defector concentration in two different cases
where the system evolves into a full cooperator state on square
lattice topology. While in the traditional model this decay is
exponentially fast, in the coevolving model it happens loga-
rithmically slow. In both cases we used L × L = 1000 × 1000
system size where we averaged over 100 independent runs. In-
set explains the basic mechanism which is responsible for the
slow relaxation of the coevolving model. Note that not all play-
ers are presented on the two-dimensional grid but only those
whose change explains how a D −D pair annihilates. Further
explanation can be found in the main text.
but this relaxation is qualitatively longer for the invasion
which is ”fastered” by coevolutionary coupling.
To demonstrate the qualitative differences of relaxation
process to the full-C state we monitored the fraction of de-
fectors for both cases where the evolutions were launched
from a random initial state. Figure 4 shows the strik-
ing differences of how the fraction of defectors decays:
while the relaxation is exponentially fast for the tradi-
tional model, it is logarithmically slow for the coevolu-
tionary model (we have used log-log plots to stress the
differences).
The qualitative difference of relaxation process can be
easily understood based on the evolution of strategy dis-
tribution we presented in Fig. 3. As we already warned
the reader in the introductory notes, the feedback mecha-
nism does not only support cooperators but also defectors:
a lonely defector in a highly cooperative environment can
collect so high temptation value which makes it strong
and provides a nice example for a neighboring cooperator
player to imitate. This elementary process is illustrated
in the inset of Fig. 4. Here we presented only those play-
ers from the grid whose strategy change explains the key
steps. Importantly, when this imitation of the successful
defector state is executed then the situation changes dras-
tically. In the new circumstance, illustrated in the middle
row of the inset, the old defector does not only loose a
beneficial link but the emergence of a new defector will
also reduce the cooperation level locally. As a result, the
effective T value that characterizes how much a defector
can exploit from a D − C link will also decay relevantly.
Consequently, instead of a strong defector player we will
have a weak D − D pair. They become vulnerable and
can be easily invaded by a neighboring cooperator player.
Depending on which defector player goes extinct the po-
sition of the original D remains intact or moves one step.
These possible options are illustrated in the bottom row
of the inset of Fig. 4. These elementary steps explain
why a lonely defector walks randomly and why it anni-
hilates when meeting with another defector due to the
consequence of strong environment feedback.
The above described process can be implemented as ran-
dom walking of lonely defectors who are left behind the
invasion front of propagating cooperator domain. Impor-
tantly, when two lonely defectors meet randomly then they
weaken each other by exactly the same reason we argued
above. Technically, it means that when two random walk-
ing defectors meet then one of them is annihilated. This
annihilation decreases the total number of defectors grad-
ually which explains the unexpectedly slow relaxation we
report in Fig. 4.
To understand the evolution of cooperation has a
paramount importance in several seemingly different re-
search disciplines [40]. The fundamental conflict of indi-
vidual and collective interests can be detected in several
problems raised by psychology, sociology [41, 42], ecology
[43], biology [44], or even in cancer research [45–47]. Dur-
ing the last decades several subtle cooperator promoting
mechanisms were identified which help to understand why
a single competitor gives up individual interest for a collec-
tive benefit [15,48–51]. But most of these models ignored
the fact that the collective behavior of a group might have
a clear consequence on the shape of local environment,
which can also influence the individual success of interact-
ing players. We should stress that several works already
concerned the difficulties originating from heterogeneous
environment [52–55], but they generally assumed a sta-
ble background where the strategy choice of competing
strategies has no direct consequence on the change of en-
vironment.
A more subtle approach is when we assume that the
players act influences the state of the environment that
has a direct consequence on the success how players inter-
act with each other. This idea can be captured by means
of a coevolutionary model where not only strategies but
also payoff elements may evolve [6]. By following this re-
search path we assume that the cooperation level of a local
community directly determines the temptation value and
the reward of mutual cooperation. This feedback can sup-
port cooperator groups, but it can also provide a stronger
temptation to choose defection. In this way we are facing
with the original dilemma of the competing strategies.
We argue that in a well-mixed population this feed-
back has no observable consequence on the competition of
strategies and the system terminates into the well-known
globally defector state. In structured populations, how-
ever, cooperators gain more and a significantly improved
cooperation level can be reached for intensive coupling. In
p-5
Szolnoki and Chen
the latter case even a full cooperator state can be reached
at a temptation value which would ensure a complete de-
fection in the feedback-free traditional evolutionary game
independently of the applied interaction topology. On
the other hand, beside the unambiguous positive effect of
environment-feedback there is an interesting consequence
on the relaxation dynamics how the above mentioned co-
operator state is reached. Due to enhanced temptation
lonely defectors die out slow because they remain vital
without followers. Their temporary success will result
in an effective random walk which eventually eliminates
them.
Our work highlights that considering coevolutionary
systems [30, 56–58] may provide not only more realistic
modeling of nature but can also offer several unantici-
pated outcomes. These consequences are expected to work
mostly in spatial systems where the spatially heteroge-
neous background prevents averaging, hence diminishing
strategy-specific consequence of feedback mechanisms. In
future studies it will be interesting to see how the concept
of varying payoff values provides other new mechanisms of
promoting the evolution of cooperation.
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